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STRANGERS WHEN WE MET: THE INFLUENCE OF
FOREIGN LABOR RELATIONS LAW AND ITS
DOMESTICATION IN JAPAN
Ryuichi Yamakawat
Abstract: This Article examines the influences of foreign law on Japanese labor
relations law and the process by which foreign legal concepts have been domesticated,
focusing in .particular on the provisions, interpretation, and operation of the Trade Union
Law of 1949. Acting on the constitutional right to organize and to bargain and act
collectively, the Japanese Diet established the framework for Japanese labor relations law
by enacting the Trade Union Law of 1945 which was subsequently amended in 1949.
While European constitutions appear to be the model for the constitutional provision
regarding the right of workers to organize and German influence has been substantial in
the realm of statutory interpretation, American influence, as exerted through the General
Headquarters during the Allied Occupation of Japan following World War II, was
predominant in the final provisions of the Trade Union Law of 1949. Despite these
foreign influences, however, there has been significant domestication in the substance of
the legislation itself, and in its interpretation and actual operation. The less adversarial
model of industrial relations has had a marked impact on domestication. Thus, the
Japanese system offers a unique model of labor relations law from which other countries
may learn.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Labor relations law is one of the most essential elements of labor law.
It has played an important role as a means of achieving industrial peace in
many countries including Japan. Since it was born and bred in the western
tradition, it is natural to assume that Japanese labor relations law has been
influenced by western legal systems. Moreover, as the process of introduc-
ing .foreign law may vary from country to country, it is interesting to
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analyze the influence of foreign law on Japanese labor relations law. On the
other hand, there are many difficulties involved in transplanting a foreign
legal system onto different soils because this process will necessarily be
accompanied by some degree of domestication. Studying the process and
background of such domestication is also important from the viewpoint of
comparative labor law.
In this context, this Article examines the influences of foreign law on
Japanese labor relations law. Part II briefly describes the contemporary
framework of labor relations law in Japan. Next, Part III analyzes foreign
influences on Japanese labor relations law and highlights several features of
the Japanese experience. The analysis covers these influences on the legal
framework itself as well as on its operation, such as statutory interpretation
by the courts. Part IV then turns to the domestication of foreign labor rela-
tions law in Japan. Domestication in the process of legislation and
domestication in the course of operation are analyzed separately. The back-
ground underlying each phase of domestication is also explored. Finally,
this Article concludes by pointing out the need for international cooperation
to search for a better legal framework of industrial relations.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF JAPANESE LABOR RELATIONS LAW
A. The Right to Organize and to Bargain and Act Collectively (The
Constitution)
Article 28 of the Constitution provides that "the right of workers to
organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed."' The meaning
of this constitutional protection of union rights is threefold.2 First, Article
28 prohibits legislation which, without compelling reas6n, denies or sup-
presses workers' rights to organize and to bargain and act collectively.3
Second, certain protected activities of unions and workers are immune from
civil and criminal liabilities to which they would otherwise be subject.4
Third, this article declares Japan's policy to foster union rights.5 This is a
policy that enables the Diet to legislate union rights statutes such as the
I KENPO [Constitution] art. 28, translated in LABOUR LAWS OF JAPAN 1990, at 9 (Ministry of Labor
trans., Japan, 1990).
2 See KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW 18-28 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992).
3 Id at 19-20.
4 Id. at 18-19.
5 Id at 19-20.
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Trade Union Law.6 Moreover, this policy becomes a public order in the
area of private law: if an employer engages in an activity that contravenes
this public order, such as a discharge of its employee because of his/her
union membership, the employer shall be liable under civil law for torts or
breach of contract.7 Coupled with the statutory rights described below, the
Constitution established the system of free collective bargaining as the basic
framework of labor relations law.
B. Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liabilities
The Trade Union Law of 1945 was enacted only four months after thd
end of World War II. This law contained provisions that declared union
immunity from certain civil and criminal liabilities. These provisions re-
mained almost unchanged in the Trade Union Law of 1949, which amended
the Law of 1945 and is essentially still in effect today. Regarding civil im-
munity, article 8 of the Trade Union Law of 1949 states, "an employer shall
not be permitted to claim indemnity from a trade union or a member of the
same for damages through a strike or other acts of dispute which are proper
acts."8 Also, according to article 1 of the Trade Union Law of 1949, article
35 of the Criminal Code,9 an exemption provision, "shall apply to collective
bargaining and other acts of a trade union which are proper and have been
performed for the attainment of the purposes of the [Law], provided, how-
ever, that in no event shall acts of violence be construed as proper acts of
trade unions." 10
C. The Effects of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Article 16 of the Trade Union Law of 1949 provides that "any portion
of an individual labor contract contravening the standards of work... pro-
vided in the collective agreement shall be void. In such a case, the
invalidated part of the individual labor contract shall be governed by the
6 R6d6 Kumiai H6 (Trade Union Law), Law No. 174 of 1949, translated in LABOUR LAWS OF
JAPAN 1990, at 19-36 (Ministry of Labor trans., Japan, 1990) [hereinafter Trade Union Law of 1949].
7 SUGENO, supra note 2, at 21-22.
8 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 8, at 22-23.
9 Article 35 of the Criminal Code provides that "[n]o person shall be punished for an act done under
law or ordinance or in the course of legitimate business." KEIHO art. 35.
10 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 2, art. 1, para. 2, at 20. As explained above, these immuni-
ties are based upon Article 28 of the Constitution. Thus, articles I and 8 of the Trade Union Law of 1949
merely confirm the effects of the constitutional provision.
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provisions of the standards."" This preemption of the provisions of an
individual labor contract by the collective agreement, called the "normative
effect of a collective bargaining agreement," has its origin in article 21 of
the Trade Union Law of 1945.12 In addition, the Trade Union Law of 1949
contains provisions for the extension of the effect of a collective bargaining
agreement within a workplace as well as within a certain local region. As to
the extension within the workplace, article 17 of the Law provides that the
normative effect of a collective bargaining agreement shall be extended in a
particular workplace to the same kind of workers as are covered by the
agreement when three-fourths or more of the workers of the same kind em-
ployed in the workplace come under application of the agreement.13 Article
18 provides for the extension of a collective bargaining agreement within a
local region. 14 These provisions also have their origin in articles 23 and 24
of the Trade Union Law of 1945 respectively. 15
D. The Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices
Article 11 of the Trade Union Law of 1945 already contained a pro-
vision that prohibited disparate treatment of an employee by an employer
based upon the employee's being a member of a trade union, having tried to
join or organize a trade union, or having performed proper acts of a trade
union.16 But article 7 of the Trade Union Law of 1949 provided for a com-
prehensive prohibition of an employer's unfair labor practices. This
provision prohibits: (1) disparate treatment as described above; (2) the re-
fusal to bargain with a union without legitimate reason; and (3) domination
of and assistance to union formation and management as well as certain
financial support to a union.17 Furthermore, while the violation of article 11
was subject to criminal liability under the Trade Union Law of 1945, the
II Id art. 16, at 24.
12 R6d6 Kumiai H6 (Trade Union Law), Law No. 51 of 1945, art. 21 [hereinafter Trade Union Law
of 1945].
13 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 17, at 24.
14 Id art. 18, at 24-25.
15 IZUTARO SUEHIRO, RODO KUMAI HO KAIsErsu [ANALYSIS OF THE TRADE UNION LAW] 105
(1946 Id. at i i.
17 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 7(l)-(3), at 22. Article 7(4) of the Trade Union Law
of 1949 also prohibits as an unfair labor practice the disparate treatment of an employee by an employer
based upon the employee's having filed a complaint with the Labor Commissions charging the employer's
unfair labor practices or having participated in certain other aspects of the administrative process. Id art.
7(4), at 22.
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Trade Union Law of 1949 abolished this scheme and established- a system
of administrative relief for unfair labor practices through the procedures of
the Labor Commissions as described below.
E. The Labor Commissions
The Trade Union Law of 1945 established the Labor Commission, a
tripartite administrative agency with members representing workers, em-
ployers, and the public interest. Each prefecture hase its Prefectural Labor
Commission, and the Central Labor Commission supervises the Prefectural
Commissions.18 Under the Law of 1945, the Commission engaged mainly
in the adjustment of labor disputes as well as in requesting prosecutors to
invoke criminal procedures against proscribed disparate treatment by em-
ployers. 19 In addition to the duty of adjusting labor disputes, the Trade
Union Law of 1949 charged the Labor Commissions with the, task of dictat-
ing administrative remedies for unfair labor practices. When, after a
hearing, the Commission finds that an employer committed an unfair labor
practice, it may order the employer to cease such a practice, and if neces-
sary, take appropriate remedial action such as reinstatement of the
discharged employee with or without back pay.20
F. Public Sector: Limitation on Union Rights
In the public sector, union rights are subject to considerable limita-
tions under several statutes. The National Civil Servants Law prohibits
employees of police and fire departments from organizing unions as well as
from bargaining and acting collectively. 2 1  Under the National Civil
Servants Law and the Local Civil Servants Law, certain other categories of
national and local civil servants do not have rights to enter into collective
bargaining agreements, although they have a right to organize.22 Regarding
the employees of national and local public enterprises, the National
Enterprise Labor Relations Law and the Local Public Enterprise Labor
18 Trade Union Law of 1945, supra note 12, art. 19; Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 19,
at 25.
19 SUEHIRO, supra note 15, at 107-108. The latter function was not incorporated into the Trade
Union Law of 1949.
20 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 27(4), at 33.
21 See Kokka K6muin H6 (National Civil Servants Law), Law No. 120 of 1947, art..108-2(5).
22 For national civil servants, see id. arts. 108-2(3) & 108-5(2). For local civil servants, see Chih6
K6muin H6 (Local Civil Servants Law), Law No. 261 of 1950, arts. 52(3) & 55(2).
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Relations Law allow them to enter into collective bargaining agreements,
subject to certain limitations.23 All public employees, including those. men-
tioned above, are prohibited from engaging in acts of dispute such as
strikes.24 The Supreme Court of Japan has held that these restrictions do
not violate Article 28 of the Constitution.25
,I1. THE INFLUENCES OF FOREIGN LABOR RELATIONS LAW
After the Meiji Restoration, Japan imported foreign legal systems,
among which the German system was predominant. This influence has
made Japan a country of the civil law tradition. As far as labor relations law
is concerned, however, post-World War II history is much more significant.
Thus, Part III first introduces a historical overview of Japanese labor
relations law and then analyzes the influences of foreign law by focusing on
its post-war development.
A. Historical Overview
1. Pre-war Attempts to Enact Labor Relations Legislation26
There was no union rights legislation in pre-war Japan. Although
several attempts were made beginning as early as 1920 to enact laws that
would protect and simultaneously regulate the organization and manage-
ment of unions, such attempts failed due to strong opposition, mainly by
management. Rather, union activities were suppressed with criminal
punishment under such laws as the Public Order and Police Law. 27 But the
pre-war attempts for union rights legislation turned out to be helpful later in
the post-war period. Still, the contents of the attempted legislation were not
original but, as shown below, were in most respects influenced by the expe-
rience of foreign countries, including Germany and Great Britain.
23 K6ky6 Kigydtait6 R6d6 Kankei H6 (National Enterprise Labor Relations Law), Law No. 257 of
1948, arts. 8-16, translated in LABOUR LAWS OF JAPAN 1990, at 48, 51-52 (Ministry of Labor trans., Japan,
199024 Id art. 17, at 53.
25 Judgment of May 4, 1977 (Nagoya Chfo Yfbin Kyoku), Saik~sai [Supreme Court], 31 Keishfi
182.
26 See generally TOKYO DAIGAKU RODO HO KENKYU KAI, .I CHKSHAKU RODO KUMIAI HO
[COMMENTARY ON TRADE UNION LAW] 10- IS (1980) [hereinafter TOKYO DAIGAKU].
27 Article 17 of the Public Order and Police Law penalized an inducement of workers to strike.
TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at 9.
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2. Trade Union Law of 1945 and its 1949,Amendment28
After Japan lost World War II, the occupation by the Allied Powers
began. The United States, the dominant country among the Allied Powers,
issued the "U.S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" dated August 29, 1945.29
It declared the encouragement of workers' organization as one of its policy
goals. The Japanese government also started to prepare for union rights
legislation by establishing a commission named the R6mu H6sei Shingi Kai
(Council on Labor Law and Policy). This commission drafted a trade union
bill, which, after several modifications, was submitted to and passed by the
Diet in December 1945. In the course of legislation, the .General
Headquarters of the Allied Powers ("GHQ") directed the government to
modify the draft only in several minor respects. However, dissatisfaction
with the Trade Union Law of 1945 grew within the GHQ.30
First, the GHQ felt that this Law was excessively interfering with the
establishment and management of unions. For example, article 6 required
registration when trade unions were established. 31 In addition, the govern-
ment had the authority to order unions to dissolve themselves 32 as well as to
change their charters under certain circumstances. 33 Next, as the union
movement in Japan intensified and the Cold War began, the GHQ wanted
Japanese unions to become "democratic," i.e., free from dictatorship by top
union officials and less politically motivated. They felt that the lack of
democracy in union management provided a background for the political
unionism induced by radical union leaders. Third, apparently concerned
about company unions frequently established by employers at that time, the
GHQ felt the need to strengthen union autonomy so that unions could be
free from the influence of employers by prohibiting their assistance to
unions more stringently. Lastly, the GHQ intended to introduce an adminis-
trative process for unfair labor practices which was combined with the idea
of the exclusive representation and appropriate bargaining unit.
28 See generally EI TAKEMAE, SENGO RODO KAIKAKU [POST WAR LABOR REFORM] (1982); KOJI
ENDO, NIPPON SENRYO To ROSHI KANKEI SEISAKU No SEIRITSU [THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POLICY] (1989); WILLIAM B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 17-43 (1984) (hereinafter GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING].
29 GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING, supra note 28, at 17.
30 See id. at 27-30.
31 Trade Union Law of 1945, supra note 12, art. 6.
32 Id. art. 15.
33 Id. art. 8.
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As a result of these developments, the Labor Section of the GHQ took
the initiative and made a recommendation as to the contents of the amend-
ment. The Ministry of Labor prepared a draft according to this
recommendation. 34 After public hearings on this draft, however, the Labor
Section handed down another recommended draft which was remarkably
different from that of the Ministry of Labor. This new draft amended the
Trade Union Law of 1945 less drastically than the first. For example, it
gave up the idea of the exclusive representation system, although it still
contained unfair labor practice provisions. In doing this, the GHQ must
have taken into account the opposition by various interest groups including
trade unions, and it intended to minimize any modifications so that the Diet
would be able to pass the bill without much difficulty. With slight changes,
this draft became the government bill which was enacted into the Trade
Union Law of 1949.
3. Union Rights and their Restriction in the Public Sector35
During'a short period after World War II, public sector employees
(except those in the police and fire departments) had basically the same
union rights as other employees in the private sector. Then, the Labor
Relations Adjustment Law, enacted in October 1946 based on a recom-
mended draft by the GHQ, prohibited acts of dispute by public employees
engaging in judicial and administrative duties.36 Other public employees
continued to enjoy the right to strike. In 1948, however, the GHQ drasti-
cally changed its policy on public sector labor relations law. In July 1948, a
letter from General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers, directed the Prime Minister of Japan to deny the right to strike to all
public employees. Soon afterwards the Japanese government issued
Government Order No. 201, which provisionally denied all public employ-
ees the rights to strike and bargain collectively.37 To implement this Order,
the Diet amended the National Civil Servants Law and enacted the Public
Corporations Labor Relations Law (after the privatization of the public
34 This draft is cited in SHIRYO NIHON SENRYO 2:. RODO KAIKAKU To RODO UNDO [MATERIALS ON
THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (2): LABOR REFORM AND LABOR MOVEMENT] 229 (Eiji Takemae et al. eds.,
1992) (hereinafter SHIRYO NIHON SENRYO].
35 ENDO, supra note 28, at 74-136, 193-283; TAKEMAE, supra note 28, at 157-176, 209-25 1; GOULD,
JAPAN'S RESHAPING, supra note 28, at 152-53.
36 R6d6 Kankei Ch6sei H6 (Labor Relations Adjustment Law) Law No. 25 of 1946, translated in
LABOUR LAWS OF JAPAN 37-47 (Ministry of Labor trans., Japan, 1990).
37 ENDO, supra note 28, at 193-219.
MAY 1995
. PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
corporations in recent years, the Public Corporations Labor Relations Law
was amended and entitled the "National Enterprise Labor Relations Law" to
cover only national enterprises). Thus, largely as a result GHQ pressure;
public sector employees have more limited rights than their private sector
counterparts.
B. Foreign Law Influences on Labor Relations Legislation
1. The Trade Union Law of 1945
As described above, the GHQ did not make recommendations .or
suggestions as to the contents of the Trade Union Law of 1945. They
merely declared a policy of fostering unionism in Japan. Thus, the bill was
drafted by the Rdmu H6sei Shingi Kai with little influence by the GHQ re-
garding its contents. In other words, as opposed to other statutes regarding
industrial relations, the contents of the Trade Union Law of 1945 were
essentially Japan's own making. Some commentators point out that this
was due to the fact that the GHQ had no official occupation policy at this
time which was concrete enough to make recommendations on the contents
of labor relations law.38 Thus, the occupation of Japan did not influence the
Trade Union Law of 1945 except to the extent that it offered an opportunity
for the GHQ to direct some minor modifications in the legislation.
However, this is not to say that it was free from the influences of foreign
law. The following are several important elements of the Law that have
apparently been influenced by foreign experiences.
a. Immunity from civil and criminal liabilities
Some of the pre-war union rights bills had already contained a provi-.
sion for the immunity of union activities from civil liability such as torts.39
This provision may have influenced the immunity provision in the Trade
Union Law of 1945. But the idea of immunity from civil liability, including
such a pre-war provision, apparently had its origin in British law. Those
who were interested in union rights legislation must have been aware of
British labor law history because Japan had virtually no experience in the
suppression of union activities through civil actions. One of the most
38 Id. at 59.
39 See TOKY6 DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at 486-87.
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famous incidents in British labor law history was the Taff Vale decision,4 0
which recognized tort liability of a union for striking, and the Trade Dispute
Act of 1906 that overrode that decision. In 1945, one of the members of the
R6mu HMsei Shingi Kai mentioned these historical British incidents in
emphasizing the need to incorporate the immunity provision into the trade
union bill.4 1
On the other hand, it is not clear how foreign law influenced the pro-
vision for immunity from criminal liability. The pre-war bills did not
contain such a provision. Even though those who drafted the bill of the
Trade Union Law of 1945 must have known the history of the British labor
law regarding immunity from the criminal liability of a trade union, the
content of the immunity was different from that of the Japanese provision.
Immunity in the British sense was unions' freedom from the doctrine of
criminal conspiracy, which did not exist in Japan. Thus, the idea of crimi-
nal immunity was not an importation from British law. Rather, it may have
been the pre-war suppression of Japanese unions through such statutes as
the Public Order and Police Law that the drafters had in mind when they
incorporated the criminal immunity provision into the Trade Union Law of
1945.42
b. The effects of collective bargaining agreements
As in the case of civil immunity, a provision regarding the normative
effect of collective bargaining agreements was contained in the pre-war
trade union bills. 43 However, it appears that this notion was derived from
German law. In 1918, Germany had an ordinance which provided for the
normative effect, and Japanese labor law scholars introduced it to Japanese
readers. This may also have been the case with the extension of the norma-
tive effect of a collective bargaining agreement within a local area.44 On the
other hand, the origin of the extension of the effect within a workplace is
not clear. The German statute on collective bargaining agreements contains
40 Taff Vale Rail Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426.
41 See KAzUO SUGENO, SOGI KOI To SONGAI BAISHO [ACTS OF DISPUTE AND COMPENSATION FOR
DAMAGES] 12 (1978) (citing a statement by Komakichi Matsuoka).
42 For a brief explanation on the history of the suppression, see TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at
9-10.
43 Id at 14-15.
44 See supra text accompanying note 14.
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a provision for the extension of the effect within local areas, but not for the
extension within a workplace. 45
c. The prohibition of disparate treatment
The prohibition of disparate treatment of an employee because of
his/her union membership or proper union activities had its origin in some
of the pre-war trade union bills. 46 Although this notion appears to have
originated from foreign law, it is difficult to specify the country which most
directly influenced the drafting because a number of foreign countries had
similar provisions at that time. Among the countries that were mentioned in
the course of the discussion in preparing for one of the bills were Germany,
Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, Romania, Brazil, and Australia (the State of
West Australia). 47
d The labor commissions
The Labor Commission under the Trade Union Law of 1945 was
charged mainly with the adjustment of labor disputes. Apparently the idea
of this Commission came from Izutaro Suehiro, a member of the Rdmu
Hsei Shingi Kai. In explaining this idea in the Shingi Kai, he pointed out
the need for an agency that would take over the duties of the Adjustment
Commission under the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law in pre-war Japan. 48
Thus, the Labor Commission succeeded to the functions that the
Adjustmental Commission performed in pre-war days. However, some
scholars point out an American influence on the organization of the
Commission. They reason that one member of the Rimu Hdsei Shingi Kai,
Iwao Ayusawa, suggested the idea of setting up an administrative agency,
referring to the National Labor Board under the National Industrial
45 Ichiro Kayatani, Nishi Doitsu Ni Okeru Ippanteki Kosoku Ryoku Seido [The Extension of the
Effect of Collective Bargaining Agreement in Germany], in RODO HO 17 JO WA DO KINO SHITE IRUKA?
[How DOES ARTICLE 17 OF THE TRADE UNION LAW FUNCTION?] 14, 14-20 (R6d6 Kumiai H6 17 J6
Kenkyui Kai ed. 1992).
46 TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at 11.
47 RODO KUMIAI HO AN [TRADE UNION BILLS] 139-40 (Bunmei Kyokai ed., 1930), cited in Kenichi
Hokao, Wagakuni ni okeru Fut6 R6d6 Ki Seido no Rekishi Teki Enkaku [The Historical Origin of Unfair
Labor Practice System in Japan], in FUTO RODO KO1 No HORI 13 (THE LAW OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
IN JAPAN] (Hokao ed., 1985) [hereinafter Hokao].
48 See Suehiro's statement in the Shingi Kai, cited in 2 RODO GYOSEI SHI [THE HISTORY OF LABOR
ADMINISTRATION] 212 (Ministry of Labor ed., 1969).
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Recovery Act.49 The National Labor Board was also established as a tri-
partite agency. These scholars further contend that the tripartite
composition of the Commission was also influenced by the tradition of
International Labor Organization ("ILO") agencies. 5°
2. The Trade Union Law of 1949
The initial recommended draft for the amendment of the Trade Union
Law of 1945, which was prepared by the GHQ, contained some American
labor law concepts. For example, the GHQ intended to introduce an exclu-
sive representation system combined with the determination of a bargaining
unit. Although the GHQ later changed its attitude and prepared another
draft, which was not drastically different from the Trade Union Law of
1945, the influence of American labor law remained in some important re-
spects. While the exclusive representation system was dropped, the
deregulation of union management, the enhancement of union independ-
ence, and the prohibition of unfair labor practices combined with the
administrative process of the Labor Commissions survived. Thus, the influ-
ence of American law is still significant.
a. The prohibition of unfair labor practices
As described above, article 7 of the Trade Union Law of 1949 pro-
hibits as unfair labor practices of an employer: (1) disparate treatment
because of union membership and protected union activities; (2) refusal to
bargain with a union without proper reason; and (3) domination of and
assistance to union formation or management as well as certain financial
support to a union.5' It is clear that section 8(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") was the model for this provision.52 The GHQ
consistently recommended incorporating this provision into the
amendment.53 It must be noted, however, that item 1 of this article
regarding the prohibition of disparate treatment has its origin in article 11 of
the Trade Union Law of 1945. 54
49 Hokao, supra note 47, at 20.
50 Id
51 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 7, at 22.
52 See National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988).
53 ENDO, supra note 28, at 286-91, 304-07.
54 See supra text accompanying note 16.
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b. . Administrative process for unfair labor practice cases
The administrative process to provide relief for unfair labor practices
was, at least in essence, also modeled after the NLRA. The recommenda-
tion of the GHQ suggested that the Labor Commission should have the
authority to issue a remedial order against an employer who committed un-
fair labor practices, rather than to merely make a request for prosecution as
under the prior scheme. 55 However, the organization of the Commission
was not changed to match the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") in
the United States. For example, the Commission remained a tripartite
agency with a certain local autonomy, although it is only the neutral mem-
bers of the Commission who may decide unfair labor practice cases. 56 In
addition, as opposed to the NLRB, the Commission has continued to play its
role as the adjustment-making agency of labor disputes. 57
c. Deregulation of the establishment and management of unions
The GHQ successfully recommended that the Japanese government
delete provisions of the Trade Union Law of 1945 that allowed governmen-
tal intervention in the establishment and management of trade unions.
Although these provisions originated from pre-war trade union bills,58 such
an interfering policy as that of the Trade Union Law of 1945 had few
precedents in the trade union laws of developed countries at the time of its
enactment. In this sense, although the influences of foreign law are evident
in the deregulation of internal union affairs in the 1949 amendment of the
Trade Union Law, it is difficult to locate a specific origin that was a model
for this amendment.
d The enhancement of union independence
The notion that a trade union must be independent from the influence
of an employer was already embodied in the Trade Union Law of 1945.
Article 2 of the Law provided that a union that admits those who represent
55 ENDO, supra note 28, at 291.
56 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 24, at 32. On the other hand, the NLRB is a central-
ized ancy and does not have members representing labor or management.
Id. art. 20, at 31.
58 See TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at I I.
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the interest of an employer or receives assistance from an employer for its
major expenses shall not avail itself of protection under the Law.59
However, the GHQ recommended that the Japanese government enhance
the requirement for union independence or "autonomy." 60 In making this
recommendation, the GHQ appears to have had the NLRA model in mind,
which excludes supervisors from its coverage. 6' This recommendation was
incorporated into the amendment, and article 2(2) of the Trade Union Law
of 1949 enlarged the scope -of the exclusion regarding supervisory
employees representing the interest of employers as-well as an employer's
assistance to unions in order to enhance union independence. 62 Moreover,
article 7(3) declared that an employer's financial assistance to union man-
agement constitutes an unfair labor practice.63 However, as explained
below, this amendment has not necessarily functioned as the GHQ intended.
3. The Constitution: Right.* to Organize and to Bargain and Act
Collectively
The current Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3,
1946. In the course of its making, the GHQ handed down a recommended
draft to the Japanese government. 64 Then, the government made a formal
draft on the basis of the GHQ draft and submitted it to the Diet. The Diet
passed this draft with slight modifications. Article 28 of the Constitution,
which the initial draft by the GHQ had already contained, was drafted by the
Subcommission on Human Rights within the Government Section of the
GHQ. Although the U.S. Constitution has no provision on union rights, the
members of this Subcommission must have been aware of the constitutions
of European countries that have union rights provisions such as that of
Germany during the Weimar period. In addition, the Rimu Hdsei Shingi
Kai, which drafted the Trade Union bill in 1945, prepared a draft for the
union rights provision in the Constitution in cooperation with the Labor
Section of the GHQ, and this draft may have had some influence on that of
the Subcommission on Human Rights.65 Moreover, the members of the
59 Trade Union Law of 1945, supra note 12, art. 2.
60 TAKEMAE, supra note 28, at 252-53.
61 National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
62 Trade Union Law of 1949, supra note 6, art. 2(2), at 20.
63 Id art. 7(2), at 22.
64 For the history of making the Constitution of Japan, see Hideo Tanaka, A History of the
Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 653-67 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).
65 TAKEMAE, supra note 28, at 82-83.
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Rjmu Hsei Shingi Kai were also familiar with constitutional provisions on
union rights in European countries and may have taken such provisions into
consideration. Thus, European constitutions may have influenced article
28, even though only indirectly. 66
4. Public Sector Labor Relations Law
As noted above, 67 the restriction of public employees' union rights
was based on the direction of the GHQ after its change of policy in 1948.
The letter from MacArthur and Government Order No. 201 that followed
denied all public employees the right to strike.68 Mr. Hoover, who took the
lead in this policy change within the GHQ, was a famous expert on person-
nel administration in the public sector in the United States. Thus, it is
natural that the GHQ's new policy was influenced by U.S. public sector
labor law. Relying on this new policy, the GHQ drew up its
recommendation for the bills that, with several modifications, were enacted
into the Public Corporations Labor Relations Law and the National Civil
Servants Law as amended. In addition to the prohibition of strikes, the
Public Corporations Labor Relations Law contained a provision for an
exclusive representation system similar to that under the NLRA. 69 In this
sense, as well, American law had its influence on the public sector labor
relations law in Japan.
5. Amendment After the Occupationo
These labor relations statutes have been amended a number of times,
with foreign and international labor law influencing some of these amend-
ments. For example, in 1965 the Diet repealed one provision in the Public
Corporations Labor Relations Law which had prohibited those who are not
the employees of the public corporation from becoming union members and
officers. This provision was in apparent conflict with the right of unions
under the ILO Convention No. 87 to have representatives of their own
66 It should also be pointed out that the Subcommission took into consideration a draft prepared by
various political parties as well as other interested groups. See Charles L. Kades, The American Role in
Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 215, 227 (1989).
6 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
68 ENDO, supra note 28, at 193-219.
69 As explained below, this provision was repealed in 1956.
70 See generally TERUO MINEMURA, KOKYO KIGYOTAITO RODO KANKEI HO [NATIONAL
ENTERPRISE LABOR RELATIONS LAW] 20-28 (2d ed., 1971).
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choosing.7 1 In 1957, the ILO Committee on the Freedom of Association
pointed out this problem as well as others in the public sector in Japan, and
reported afterwards that such a provision interferes with union rights. The
repeal of the provision was influenced by this report and other subsequent
recommendations of the ILO.
C. Foreign Law Influences on the Operation of Japanese Labor
Relations Law-Influences on Statutory Interpretation
In addition to the direct influences of foreign laws on labor relations
legislation, Japanese courts and scholars have studied foreign labor law and
sometimes worked out interpretations that led to the same result as found
under foreign law. In other words, foreign law has influenced the interpre-
tation of Japanese industrial relations statutes. The following are some
examples of such influence.
1. The Theory on Collective Bargaining Agreements
In Germany, labor law scholars have developed a comprehensive
theory on collective bargaining agreements. According to their theory, a
collective bargaining agreement has- two effects: the normative effect and
the contract obligation. 72 The normative effect is a preemptive effect on the
individual employment contract. This effect is no more than the effect of
minimum standards: if working conditions provided for in an individual
employment contract are more advantageous than those of the collective
bargaining agreement, they are valid and not influenced by the collective
bargaining agreement (the "advantageousness principle" or
"Begunstigungsprinzip"). On.the other hand, the contract-obligation effect
creates an obligor-obligee relationship between parties to the agreement,
except that the doctrine of contract law does not always apply due to the
unique features of the collective bargaining agreement. After the expiration
of a collective bargaining agreement, working conditions under the agree-
ment remain in effect unless otherwise provided under other collective
agreements, individual employment contracts, or workplace agreements.
71 International Labor Organization, Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, arts. 2-3, 68 U.N.T.S. 17,20.
72 See generally TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at 724-26.
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This effect is called "after-effectiveness" or "Nachwirkung." In Germany,
these doctrines have been incorporated into statutory provisions.
Although the Trade Union Law of 1949 provides for the normative
effect under article 16, the Law remains silent as to the other German
doctrines. But Japanese labor law scholars have learned much from German
theory and developed similar doctrines, some of which have been adopted
by Japanese courts. For example, some courts have held that working
conditions provided for under collective bargaining agreements are
incorporated into individual employment contracts and that such working
conditions continue to exist as part of the contracts even after the expiration
of collective agreements. 73 This holding is obviously influenced by the
German theory of the "after-effectiveness" or "Nachwirkung." Of course,
there are differences in many respects. Nevertheless, it may be safe to say
that the theory of the collective bargaining agreement in Japan has been
influenced by German law.
2. The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees." 74  Section 8(d) goes on to define the duty to bargain
collectively as the duty to "meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. .. ."75 In essence, this duty is the obligation to "participate
actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a
basis for agreement. 76
On the other hand, article 7(2) of the Trade Union Law of 1949
merely prohibits an employer's refusal to bargain without proper reason,
and there is no reference to the good faith requirement. However, Japanese
scholars who have studied American labor law have introduced the doctrine
of the duty to bargain in good faith. 77 Now, the Labor Commissions and
courts have agreed that an employer has this duty, the contents of which are
73 See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 28, 1968 (Teizen Kotsu), Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], 516 HANREI JIHO
74.
74 National Labor Relations Act § 8(aX5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). Section 8(bX3) provides
that the union's refusal to bargain also constitutes an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(bX3).
75 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
76 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
77 SUGENO, supra note 2, at 488.
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essentially the same as those in the United States.78 Here, it is obvious that
American labor law has influenced Japanese law regarding collective
bargaining.
D. Summary
Although Japan had no union rights law before World War II, there
were several attempts for such legislation. Some of the concepts in such
attempts were influenced by German and British law. During the occupa-
tion of Japan after World War II, the basic framework of Japanese labor
relations law was established. The influence of foreign law during this
period has two distinct aspects. First, especially during the early period, the
occupation brought about a democratic climate as a basis for union rights
legislation. The Allied Powers even directed Japan to legislate labor stat-
utes. During this early period, however, the Allied Powers did not control
the contents of labor relations law. As in the case of the Trade Union law of
1945, they merely directed legislation or suggested slight modifications at
best. The drafters of the Trade Union Law of 1945 took into consideration
foreign law as well as pre-war bills, which were also influenced by foreign
laws. Thus, the occupation facilitated Japan's enactment of labor relations
legislation through a process of learning from foreign law experiences.
Later, the Allied Powers began to control the contents of industrial
relations legislation by making suggestions and even by handing down its
recommended drafts as in the case of the Trade Union Law of 1949. The
main foreign law that influenced Japanese legislation in such situations was,
as a matter of course, American law such as the NLRA. In this respect,
although the occupation was carried out through indirect governance, its
influence on labor relations legislation was direct. Even after the frame-
work of labor relations law was established, foreign law has continued to
influence Japanese law in terms of statutory interpretation.
In sum, the influence of foreign law on Japanese labor relations law is
quite marked. But its process and nature are somewhat complex. Roughly
speaking, Japanese labor relations law is a hybrid in nature. Some aspects
originated from German and British law, while others were transplanted
from American law.
78 See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 22, 1989, Chisai [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], 548 RODO HANREI 64.
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IV. THE DOMESTICATION OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS IN LABOR RELATIONS
LAW
The domestication of foreign law takes several forms. In some cases,
legislative attempts to transplant foreign systems may fail because of
indigenous factors. In other cases, even after the transplantation of foreign
systems, courts or scholars may interpret statutes so that it will suit domes-
tic circumstances. Moreover, the indigenous features of industrial relations
may develop independently from the legal framework. Thus, this section
describes these features and explores the background for each dimension of
domestication: (1) domestication in the course of labor legislation; (2)
domestication in the operation of labor relations law with reference to
statutory interpretation and the function of the Labor Commissions; and (3)
the development of the system of industrial relations.
A. Domestication in the Course of Labor Legislation: The Trade Union
Law of 1949
The history of the legislation of the Trade Union Law of 1949 clearly
indicates the domestication of foreign labor relations law in the course of
enacting legislation. Plural unionism, the organization and procedures of
the Labor Commissions, and the lack of provisions for union unfair labor
practices are major examples.
1. Plural Unionism: Lack of Exclusive Representation System
The original draft of the Trade Union Law of 1949 prepared by the
Ministry of Labor contained many more American elements than the final
draft that was ultimately enacted into law. The original draft provided for
the exclusive representation system based on the determination of an appro-
priate bargaining unit.79 This provision was clearly modeled after the
system under the NLRA. But subsequently the GHQ changed its policy and
delIeted the provision from its recommended draft. As a result, Japanese
labor relations law has a marked system of plural unionism as one of its
fundamental features. When two unions represent separate portions of the
employees of an employer, the employer must bargain with each union
regardless of the number of employees they represent. Moreover, Japanese
79 See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
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courts have held that an employer has a duty to remain neutral: an
employer may not discriminate against unions because of their policies.8 0
One of the reasons for the GHQ's change in policy was union oppo-
sition to the incorporation of the exclusive representation system. The
publication of one of the earlier drafts for the amendment of the Trade
Union Law and a series of subsequent public hearings gave rise to a fierce
union movement opposing the amendment for various reasons.81 For trade
unions, the procedure to determine bargaining representatives was an undue
burden because they had already engaged in collective bargaining after
World War II. Moreover, unions contended that the exclusive representa-
tion system would not suit realities in Japan.
As this contention implies, a more significant factor in the policy
change was the Japanese style of union organization. Typical unions in the
United States are industrial or craft unions which are organized across
boundaries of a single enterprise. Historically, such industrial or craft
unions often competed with one another to represent workers at the enter-
prise level. 82 Such disputes provided a background for the exclusive
representation system. On the other hand, most unions in Japan are enter-
prise-based or company-based. Thus, in Japan, it was not generally
necessary to set up a system for resolving such disputes. Even though there
were cases where two or more unions were opposing one another within one
enterprise or company, the introduction of the exclusive representation sys-
tem would have deprived minority unions of an opportunity to bargain and
thus would not have been acceptable. In addition, it would have been
difficult in Japan to determine the appropriate bargaining unit. In the
United States, one of the most important factors in determining the bargain-
ing unit is job content.83 For example, there are units for production and
maintenance workers, technical employees and the like. On the other hand,
job definition in Japan is much more vague, which makes it difficult to
divide employees according to their jobs.
For these reasons, the exclusive representation system based on the
determination of a bargaining unit would not suit Japanese industrial
relations. Unions, employers, and drafters of trade union bills must have
had difficulty in understanding what this system really meant and how it
functioned. The consequences of this problem are evident in the history of
80 See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 23, 1985 (Nissan Jid6sha), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 39 Minshfi 730.
81 See Hokao, supra note 47, at 27-28.
82 WILLIAM B. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 41 (2d ed., 1993).
83 See generally I DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 448-72 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3rd ed., 1992).
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the Public Enterprises Labor Relations Law: although the Law initially
contained a provision for a bargaining unit system, it was abolished in 1956.
2. The Organization and Procedure of the Labor Commissions
Although the system of administrative relief for unfair labor practices
under the Trade Union Law of 1949 was modeled after the NLRA, the
organization and procedure of the-Labor Commissions were very different
from those of the NLRB.8 4 There are six major differences. First, while the
NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases, courts in
Japan have a concurrent jurisdiction along with the Commissions so long as
unfair labor practices are "legal disputes" within the meaning of the Court
Organization Law.8 5 Second, the Labor Commissions are charged with the
duty to adjust labor disputes as well as the duty to adjudicate unfair labor
practice cases, whereas the NLRB does not have the function of adjustment.
Third, as opposed to the NLRB, whose members are all neutral and regular
public officials, the Labor Commissions consist of part-time members
representing labor, management, and the public interest. Fourth, unlike
such centralized agencies as the NLRB, the Labor Commissions are
established in each prefecture with some -local autonomy, and each
Commission may develop its own practices to a certain degree. Fifth, as to
procedures, the Labor Commissions do not have a department for prosecu-
tion like the General Counsel of the NLRB. Thus, the parties before the
Labor Commissions are workers (unions) and employers. Finally, unlike
the NLRA, the Trade Union Law has no provision for the substantial
evidence rule or other limitations on the judicial review of the orders issued
by the Labor Commissions.
These domestic features in the organization and procedures of the
Labor Commissions are, in most respects, due to the fact that the Trade
Union Law of 1945 had already established the Commissions, which
essentially succeeded to the adjustmental functions of the Adjustment
Commissions under the pre-war Labor Dispute Adjustment Law. The Trade
Union Law of 1949 merely charged the Labor Commissions with the
additional function of remedying unfair labor practices. In the course of the
legislation of the Law of 1949, the GHQ left the organization of the Labor
84 For a comparison between the Labor Commission and the NLRB, see Hiroya Nakakubo, Kyusai
System to Shite no R6d5 linkai [The Labor Relations Commission in the Prevention of Unfair Labor
Practices], in 72 NIPPON RODO HO GAKKAI SHI 5 (1988).
85 Saibansho H6 (Court Organization Law), Law No. 59 of 1947.
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Commissions virtually untouched. Thus, the Labor Commissions started
their activities as adjudicating agencies for unfair labor practices with their
organization mostly unchanged from when they were merely adjustmental
agencies.
As to procedures, although the GHQ in their early suggestions.
attempted to incorporate provisions into the amendment of the Trade Union
Law of 1945 for some limitations on the judicial review of administrative
orders, they withdrew this idea when they handed down their recommended
drafts to the Japanese government.8 6 Apparently some officials in the
Ministry of Justice opposed the GHQ's early suggestion.8 7 They seem to
have, contended that the American system for enforcement and judicial
review did not suit the traditional judicial system in Japan. In fact, Japan
had no preceding history of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRB, much
less the limitation on judicial review under the substantial evidence rule. As
a result, Japanese courts have engaged in de novo review of the
Commission's orders.
3. The Lack of Union Unfair Labor Practices
Almost two years before the enactment of the Trade Union Law of
1949, the U. S. Congress drastically amended the NLRA. This amendment
(the Taft-Hartley Act) introduced, inter alia, union unfair labor practices 88
This was a reaction to the increased power of unions under the NLRA (the
Wagner Act). However, in making suggestions as to the amendment of the
Trade Union Law of 1945, the GHQ did not regard union unfair labor
practices as necessary for Japanese labor relations law. Although one of the
drafts contained a provision implying that a union has a duty to bargain in
good faith with an employer, 89 this provision was deleted. Later, in 1951,
the Ministry of Labor attempted to incorporate provisions for certain union
unfair labor practices into the Trade Union Law.90 However, this attempt
86 The draft dated Feb. 14, 1949, contained a provision similar to the substantial evidence rule
(Article 20(3)). See SHIRYO NIHON SENRYO, supra note 34, at 235. But the subsequent draft did not con-
tain such a provision.
87 ENDO, supra note 28, at 301.
88 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988).
89 Article 23(2) of the draft dated Feb. 14, 1949. See SHIRYO NIHON SENRYO, supra note 34, at 235.
90 The draft prepared by the Ministry of Labor is cited in MINISTRY OF LABOR, RODO KUMIAI
HO/RODO KANKEI CHOSEI HO [TRADE UNION LAW/LABOR RELATIONS ADJUSTMENT LAW] 145 (3d ed.,
1988).
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also failed. Thus, to this day, the prohibition of unfair labor practices has
been solely directed toward employers.
There must have been little need for union unfair labor practice pro-
visions at that time. Although union movements in the occupation period
sometimes became fierce, unions were not so strong or powerful as to make
it necessary to introduce prohibitions against union unfair labor practices.
B. The Operation of Labor Relations Law: Statutory Interpretation
In the area of statutory interpretation, domestic influences have had a
considerable impact, especially with regard to the theory of collective bar-
gaining agreements and the interpretation of the relationship between labor
and management.
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements as the Norm of Enterprise
Despite the fact that Japanese legal theory on collective bargaining
agreements was influenced by German law, Japanese courts and scholars
have devised interpretations that are considerably different from those in
Germany. For example, while German law has established the so-called
"advantageousness principle" or "Begunstigungsprinzip" under which col-
lective bargaining agreements provide for minimum working conditions for
workers to whom they apply, it is not at all settled in Japan whether working
conditions provided by collective agreements are minimum standards or
exclude more advantageous provisions in individual employment contracts.
Although case law is not clear on this issue, an increasing number of schol-
ars have contended that the "advantageousness principle" does not generally
apply.91 They reason that Japanese collective bargaining agreements are
usually concluded on an enterprise-basis or company-basis, and therefore
parties to the agreements tend to regard the conditions contained in them as
uniform standards rather than minimum.92 It is clear that such a contention
has its basis in company-based unionism in Japan. Once again, here is an
example of a feature of Japanese industrial relations becoming the basis for
a unique form of law through domestication.
91 SUGENO, supra note 2, at 514.
92 Id.
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2. Elusive Demarcation between Labor and Management
Based on the suggestions by the GHQ, the Trade Union Law of 1949
provides for more comprehensive exclusion of representatives of an
employer's interest as well as for stricter prohibition of financial assistance
from an employer than the Trade Union law of 1945. 93 This policy
apparently derives from the western notion that the labor-management rela-
tionship is an adversarial one.
Nevertheless, such an adversarial model has not taken root in Japan.
As to the provision for union independence, many Japanese labor law
scholars have attempted to narrowly construe the provision.94 For example,
supervisors are held to be excluded from the coverage of the law only when
they have direct authority in personnel decisions; an authority to make
recommendations for such decisions is not sufficient.95 They reasoned that
the scope of union membership should be determined by unions themselves
without legal interference. 96 This narrow construction is also evident in the
interpretation of the provision prohibiting an employer's financial assis-
tance as an unfair labor practice. Many commentators share the view that
even if certain assistance may seem to be within the scope of the proscrip-
tion, it may not constitute an unfair labor practice unless it substantially
disturbs the independence of unions.97 These interpretations may reflect the
less adversarial nature of Japanese industrial relations. In Japan, labor and
management are supposed to share a communal interest rather than be
adversaries in a zero-sum game. Meanwhile, in the United States where an
adversarial model has prevailed, the exclusion of managerial employees has
been enforced more strictly.98
3.: Adjustmental Interpretation
Japanese labor law is abundant in adjustmental interpretation: an
interpretation which attaches great importance to the balance of interests
between labor and management on a case-by-case basis rather than through
the establishment of definite rules. For example, with regard to the issue of
93 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
94 See generally TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note 26, at 146.
95 See id at 149.
96 Id at 148.
97 Id at 479.
98 See GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING, supra note 28, at 3-6, 143.
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under what circumstances an employer may avoid the obligation to pay
wages to workers in case of a lockout, the Supreme Court has held that a
lockout shall exempt an employer from the duty to pay wages:
if, in light of various circumstances such as the attitude taken in
the relevant labor-management negotiations, their progress, the
forms of dispute acts engaged in by the union, and the extent of
their impact upon the employer, the lockout is viewed, from the
equity in labor-management relations, as a proper means of
defending the employer's business against the union's dispute
acts.9-.
Thus, adjustmental interpretation facilitates a more equitable legal relation-
ship between labor and management through consideration of all the
circumstances and interests involved in a particular dispute.
This type of analysis is also applicable in the case of a conflict be-
tween an employer's property rights and a union's posting of handbills.
Although the Supreme Court in a recent case held to the contrary,O00 the
Labor Commissions and many labor law scholars have taken the view that
the posting of handbills shall be recognized as a proper union activity. 101
Also, such posting shall not be a reason for disciplinary action if it is
prompted by a great need on the part of the union and it does not cause
substantial interference with the employer's property rights in light of
various factors including the character of the facilities, the extent of posting,
the number, form and language of the handbills, and the method of post-
ing. 102 The Labor Commissions have often relied on a similar standard
when determining whether the employer's exercise of the property rights,
e.g., a disciplinary warning or disbandment order, constitutes an unfair labor
practice, although such determination needs the evaluation of the
99 Judgment of Apr. 25, 1975 (Marushima Suimon), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 29 MinshfO 481.
100 The Supreme Court held that a union activity on an employer's property without the employer's
consent would not be protected unless the employer's rejection to consent constitutes an abuse of its
property right. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1979 (Kokutetsu Sapporo Unten Ku), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 33
MinshOi 647.
101 See generally TOKYO DAIGAKU, supra note' 26, at 542-43. Similar factors are listed in
determining whether a union's tactics of wearing ribbons, armbands, or badges are proper union activities.
See id at 542.
102 Id
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employer's practice in light of the policy. of establishing sound industrial
relations.103
As a matter of course, keeping a balance of interests is more or less
necessary in interpreting labor law in every country. But, to the extent that
such adjustmental interpretations are relied upon so often, it appears to be
one of the distinctive features of Japanese labor relations law. Moreover,
given the standards of adjustment illustrated above, it appears that a
philosophy underlying such interpretations is that legal protection should be
granted when a situation is too disadvantageous to one of the parties in the
industrial relationship. Once again, the basis of this philosophy may be the
less adversarial model of industrial relations because an utterly one-sided
situation undermines relations between labor and management. In the con-
text of unfair labor practice law, where this philosophy also applies,
Professor William Gould of Stanford University correctly points out:
[In Japan] the entire concept of unfair labor practices as it has
evolved in the United States is less precise and different in its
meaning. It suggests that there are not public rights or wrongs,
but rather problems that need third-party assistance so that
harmony and compatibility may be facilitated. ' 04
Hence, the less adversarial Japanese model of industrial relations has
created an interpretive framework under which laws are construed in a
manner which is geared towards limiting conflict between labor and man-
agement.
C. The Operation of Labor Relations Law: the Labor Commissions
As stated earlier, the Labor Commissions are charged with the duty of
remedying unfair labor practices as well as adjusting trade disputes.' 05
Although the former function was basically modeled after the American
scheme, its actual operation in Japan has varied considerably from that of its
American counterpart.
103 Decision of Dec. 5, 1979 (Saisei Kai Chfi6 By6in), Chii6 R6d6 linkai [Central Lab. Comm.], 66
MeireishOi 84. But the Supreme Court, relying on the Kokutetsu Sapporo Unten Ku, supra note 101, set
aside the order of the Central Labor Commission in this case. Judgment of Dec. 11, 1989, Saik6sai
[Supreme Court], 43 Minsh 1786.
104 GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING, supra note 28, at 43.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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For example, a large portion of unfair labor practice cases result in
settlement. In 1990, seventy-two percent of the cases were settled in the
Prefectural Labor Commissions. 106 To be sure, the resolution of unfair
labor practice cases through settlement quite often takes place even in the
United States. 107 However, since the NLRB (the General Counsel) is the
complaining party in the procedure under the National Labor Relations Act,
the Board can and often does reject, as opposing public policy, the private
or non-Board settlements that are reached between employers and unions.
Thus, the private settlement is subject to the public policy doctrine that
unfair labor practices are a public wrong. 108 In Japan, on the other hand, the
resolution of cases through settlement is left entirely to employers and
unions (workers) as parties to the procedure. In this sense, the operation of
the unfair labor practice system is more adjustmental. This adjustmental
feature is further enhanced by the fact that members of the Commissions
representing labor and management may participate in the hearing and
encourage settlements, and that the Labor Commissions have a department
for adjusting disputes, which may handle pending unfair labor practice
cases.
In addition, remedies* ordered by the Labor Commissions are often
adjustmental. In a number of cases, the Commissions, rather than determin-
ing the remedy by themselves, have ordered employers who committed
unfair labor practices to consult or bargain with unions over certain
remedies such as the conditions of reinstatement in a case of retaliatory dis-
charge. 10 9  Apparently this practice is based on the idea that such
consultation would function better than direct remedies in establishing
harmonious industrial relations. The Commissions also order what is called
a conditional relief on an infrequent basis. When the Commission orders
this form of relief, the employer is obligated to take remedial actions if and
only if the union performs certain actions mentioned as a condition in the
order, such as furnishing a document in which the union admits
106 829 CH06RODO JIHO 16(1991).
107 In fiscal year 1988, 31.5% of the unfair labor practice cases closed consisted of settlements and
adjustments. Among the rest of the closed cases, 30.9% ended up in withdrawals of charges, a substantial
number of which must have been resulted from private settlements. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5 (1990).
108 See, e.g., NLRB v. General MotorsCorp., 116 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 1940).
109 See, e.g., Decision of Jan. 25, 1972 (Chase Manhattan Bank), Tokyo Local Lab. Comm., 46
Meireishfi 79.
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unacceptable behavior." 10 Such an order also reflects the adjustmental fea-
ture of dispute resolution through the Labor Commissions. I I
D. Industrial Relations: Joint-Consultation System
Although the Trade Union Law of 1949 was enacted under the influ-
ence of American law, the grievance and arbitration procedure, which is one
of the distinctive features of American industrial relations, has not taken
root in Japan. The GHQ recommended the adoption of the grievance sys-
tem in collective bargaining agreements and even suggested that the Trade
Union Law of 1945 should be amended to provide that collective bargaining
agreements shall contain provisions for a grievance procedure." 12
Nevertheless, to this day, labor and management have rarely relied upon
such a system.
Instead, Japanese industrial relations have now become famous for
the joint-consultation system or labor-management consultation system.
This system affords an opportunity for two-way communication as well as
information sharing between labor and management. 113 The subject matter
covered includes not only mandatory bargaining subjects like the planning
and the implementation of discharges and transfers but also certain
management prerogatives. In 1989, 58.1% of the enterprises where more
than fifty employees are employed have this joint-consultation system. 14
One of the primary functions of the joint-consultation system is the
prevention of labor disputes. Before certain personnel actions, such as
transfers, are implemented, they are referred to consultation in order to
minimize potential conflicts that may arise as a result. It must be noted that,
roughly speaking, the better this system functions and prevents disputes, the
less necessary it is to invoke the grievance system for resolving disputes."15
Obviously, from the viewpoint of maintaining peaceful industrial relations,
preventing labor disputes is preferable to resolving them after they arise. In
110 Decision of Mar. 8, 1965 (Nobeoka Yfibin Kyoku), Pub. Corp. Lab. Comm., Koroi Meireishfi
212.
111 See GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING, supra note 28, at 89-90.
112 See TAKEMAE, supra note 28, at 260.
113 See generally SUGENO, supra note 2, at 475.
114 RODO DAuIN KANBO SEISAKU CHOSA Bu, NIPPON NO ROSHi COMMUNICATION No GENJO [THE
CURRENT SITUATION OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LABOR AND MANAGEMENT] 13 (1990).
115 Noriaki Kojima, Kigyd Nai ni Okeru Funsd Kaiketsu [Dispute Resolution (DR) in the
Enterprise], in 80 NIPPON RODO HO GAKKAI SHI 42-44 (1992).
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this sense, the joint-consultation system, like adjustmental interpretation, is
based on the less adversarial nature of industrial relations in Japan.
E. Summary and Analysis
Indeed, there are various factors that have influenced the domestica-
tion of foreign labor relations law in Japan: the traditional legal system, the
history and strength of unions, the pre-war Adjustment Commissions,
enterprise-based unionism, and the employment practices of Japanese
companies. The most distinctive factor, however, is the less adversarial
model of Japanese industrial relations. It may explain many Japanese fea-
tures in the operation of the labor relations law after its framework was
established.
Then what is the origin of such a concept of industrialrelations? To a
certain degree, Japanese culture may be significant in that Japanese people
generally prefer to avoid confrontation. However, it may be difficult to
employ this argument to explain why the less adversarial feature of
Japanese industrial relations was established almost twenty years after
World War II. If Japanese culture were the determinative factor, such a
model of industrial relations would have emerged earlier, or would have
been fostered by the government and employers even before World War II.
As a matter of fact, industrial relations in Japan had often been adversarial
until the 1960s.116 This order of events also indicates that the company-
based unionism, which came into being just after World War II, was not the
determinative factor for the development of less adversarial industrial rela-,
tions. Thus, there must have been additional domestic factors other than the
Japanese culture.
One such factor may be the structure of corporate ownership in
Japan.I1 7 After World War II, many large stockholders who controlled
management in large corporations disappeared for reasons such as the disso-
lution of the zaibatsu, the financial conglomerates in the pre-war period.
Thus, in a number of large corporations, ownership was divided into. much
smaller segments, and large stockholders quite often turned out to be other
corporations which were interested not in receiving fat dividends but in the
prevention of takeovers. In addition, the Japanese economy just after World
116 See KAZOU SUGENO & YASUO SUWA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
(Japan Int'l Labor Law Forum Paper no. 1) 48-53 (1994).
117 TADANOR NISHIYAMA, SHIHAI K&ZO RON [THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE CONTROL] 26-73
(1980); see also GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING, supra note 28, at 166..
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War II was not sufficiently strong to provide a stock market where many
individuals could buy stocks in order to profit from dividends. Thus, in
large corporations, there were no conspicuous group of "capitalists" in the
American or European sense who owned and controlled the corporations in
order to increase their dividends. Indeed, one commentator contends that
Japan is not a capitalist country in this sense. 18 Therefore, control of such
corporations is left to those who work there, whether they are management
or labor. Since management in such corporations was not under stockholder
control, the conflict of interests between labor and management were much
less sharp. They found common interests in making profit with long term
perspective as well as in maintaining stable employment. This is one of the
reasons why Japanese employers have tried hard to avoid discharging
workers even when they feel the need to cut costs or restructure their
organization. At the same time, however, the lack of stockholder control
has often caused the absence of a check from outside, which may lead to
self-indulgence by labor and management. In any event, such a community
of interests may explain the less adversarial nature of industrial relations
which appeared in post-war Japan.
V. CoNcLusIoN: FUTURE PROSPECTS
Foreign law has had a considerable influence on Japanese labor rela-
tions law both in its formation and in its operation. The Allied Powers that
occupied Japan not only afforded an opportunity for union rights legislation
but sometimes made recommendations as to the contents of legislation.
While such recommendations were often modeled after American systems,
Japan in its modernization also learned significantly from other foreign
countries such as Germany and Great Britain. However, Japan has domesti-
cated some elements of imported union rights laws. Such domestication
took place especially when the imported framework or theory did not suit
the Japanese concept of industrial relations.
Is there nothing more to be learned from foreign countries? The
answer is no. Foreign law has experienced further development since the
occupation period and has produced new statutes and case law. Whether
such experience is worth transplanting or not, it nevertheless offers a source
of informative experiments. What must be noted at present is that European
or American law is not the only foreign law from which to learn: the
118 NISHIYAMA, supranote 117, at66.
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development of labor relations law in Asian and other countries is also
informative.
On the other hand, it may be time for Asian countries including
Japan to furnish other regions of the world with information on their own
union rights laws. The United States and European countries are also
searching for a new paradigm of industrial relations as well as a legal
framework that will suit such a paradigm. Although it is not clear whether
the Japanese (or Asian) model of industrial relations will become such a
paradigm, at least it is worthwhile to share and analyze each other's experi-
ences. Such a comparative analysis is an important step to search for better
industrial relations.
